Harvest now, decrypt later

Encrypted data an attacker records todaycan be opened on Q‑Day.

Harvest now. An attacker can record your encrypted data as it crosses networks you don’t own, cheaply and without a trace.Decrypt later. The attacker only has to wait for Q‑Day, the day a quantum computer can unlock that data, and research keeps moving that day closer.2–4On the record. The White House warns of adversaries “collecting United States information now, and decrypting it later.”1Years of your data, exposed at once.
And suddenly, the liability is yours.

How the attack works
  1. TodayCapturedAn attacker copies your encrypted data off the network, unnoticed.
  2. For yearsStoredYour data sits in the attacker’s archive, waiting for Q‑Day.
  3. Q-DayDecryptedA quantum computer breaks today’s key exchange.5 Years of your recorded data become readable to the attacker at once.

You don’t need a quantum computer to stop this. The attacker does.

What you can still protect

Unfortunately, if an attacker already has a copy of your data, no one can protect that copy, not even us.Everything you send after you switch to PacketLoq can be protected.

Every day your links run without PacketLoq adds to the attacker’s archive. Switch to PacketLoq, and let the attacker record. On Q‑Day, the recording still won’t open.

See how we stop it →

Q‑DAY WINDOW today203020352040 Now the recording starts,and grows every day 2030 U.S. federal deadlineto get ahead of Q‑Day 20× less hardware needed, soQ‑Day keeps moving closer Now the recording starts,and grows every day 2030 U.S. federal deadlineto get ahead of Q‑Day Q‑DAY WINDOW 20× less hardware needed, soQ‑Day keeps moving closer
Now
when the recording starts

Q‑Day only decides when the attacker can open the recording. Executive Order 14412 warns that adversaries may already be collecting encrypted data to decrypt later.1 Quantum experts surveyed by the Global Risk Institute put the chance of Q‑Day within ten years at 28–49%, the highest in the report’s history.4

2030
U.S. federal deadline to get ahead of Q‑Day

Executive Order 14412 requires post-quantum key establishment on high-value and high-impact federal systems by December 31, 2030, and directs a rule holding covered federal contractors to NIST’s standards by the same date.1

20×
fewer qubits needed to break RSA‑2048

In 2025, Google’s Craig Gidney cut that estimate about twentyfold, with better math, not better machines.2 A quantum computer attacks the key exchange, not the AES‑256 that encrypts the data.

How exposed are your links? See a typical bank → Think this is hypothetical? See what’s already happened →
How it works

The secret never crosses the wire.

IPsec and TLS start every connection by agreeing on a key in the open. That method was invented in 1976 for computers that have never met. Your two sites already know each other, so PacketLoq skips that step, and the attacker has no key exchange to record.

The same link today and with PacketLoq Today the key exchange crosses the link in the open and is recorded. With PacketLoq the key is placed at both ends in advance, session keys stay inside the link, and a recording of the link holds nothing to break. TODAY: THE STANDARD EVERYONE TRUSTS Site A+ IPsec or TLS Site B+ IPsec or TLS KEY EXCHANGE Recorded, and breakable by a quantum computer WITH PACKETLOQ KEY FILL 1 Site A+ PacketLoq Site B+ PacketLoq 3 Recorded, but nothing to break 2session keys 2session keys DECRYPTED STILL UNREADABLE Q‑DAY The same link today and with PacketLoq TODAY: THE STANDARD EVERYONE TRUSTS Site A+ IPsec/TLS Site B+ IPsec/TLS KEY EXCHANGE Recorded, and breakableby a quantum computer WITH PACKETLOQ KEY FILL 1 Site A+ PacketLoq Site B+ PacketLoq 3 Recorded, butnothing to break 2 Session keys set up inside the link DECRYPTED STILL UNREADABLE Q‑DAY
  1. 1
    The key is placed in advance.It’s loaded at both ends, so it never travels over the link.
  2. 2
    Session keys stay inside the link.Nothing is negotiated in the open.
  3. 3
    Keys rotate on their own.Every gigabyte by default (customizable), with old keys erased from memory.
The result
  • A recording holds nothing to break
  • No handshake for a quantum computer to attack
  • Still safe after Q‑Day

PacketLoq’s approach is its own invention.Patent pending in the US, Canada and the EU.

What it looks like on your wire

The difference is the first two frames.

The same site-to-site link, recorded on IPsec and then on PacketLoq.

Your link today · IPsec
capture · branch ↔ core
No.SourceProtocolInfo
1203.0.113.4ISAKMPIKE_SA_INIT   key exchange payload
2198.51.100.9ISAKMPIKE_SA_INIT   key exchange payload
3203.0.113.4ISAKMPIKE_AUTH
4203.0.113.4ESPSPI=0x8f2a1c04   encrypted
5198.51.100.9ESPSPI=0x1d77b930   encrypted
…ESPevery packet that follows
Break the two highlighted frames and everything below them opens. Those two frames are the key exchange. Shor’s algorithm was built to break them.5
The same link · PacketLoq
capture · branch ↔ core
No.SourceProtocolInfo
1203.0.113.4UDP9876 → 9876   Len=1422
2198.51.100.9UDP9876 → 9876   Len=1422
3203.0.113.4UDP9876 → 9876   Len=1422
4198.51.100.9UDP9876 → 9876   Len=1422
5203.0.113.4UDP9876 → 9876   Len=1422
…UDPevery packet that follows
Nothing is highlighted, because there’s no key exchange to see. Every frame looks the same.
Why can a quantum computer break those two frames, but not ours? See how Shor’s algorithm works →
Compare

Your options for Q‑Day, compared.

Everyone else hardens the handshake. PacketLoq removes it.

Everyone else adds something

5 Site ASite B 3 1 2 4
  1. 1Post‑quantum key exchangeA handshake that’s still recorded
  2. 2Post‑quantum pre‑shared keysStatic keys, changed by hand
  3. 3Hardware link encryptorsA new box at every site
  4. 4Key‑delivery servicesSomeone else in your key loop
  5. 5Quantum key distributionSpecial hardware and dedicated fiber

PacketLoq

Site A Site B

Nothing to record, keys that rotate on their own, on hardware you already own.

Why not just turn on post‑quantum IPsec?

Keep it. It comes in two forms, and PacketLoq runs under either.

A post‑quantum key exchange is harder to break, but it’s still sent, and still recorded.

Post‑quantum pre‑shared keys are the closest to our approach. But they’re static and handled by hand, and one major vendor’s guide says they don’t scale well across many sites.6 PacketLoq rotates keys on its own, under the VPN, router or firewall you already have.

Use cases

Find the link you’re responsible for

PacketLoq protects links where you control both ends: your own sites, servers and cloud instances, or a partner under contract. For strangers on the open internet, keep TLS.

Protects links in any of these layouts

  • Site to site
  • Hub and spoke
  • Mesh
  • Client to server

Select your industry

If you run encryption for a bank

Branch to core, and data center replication

Payment instructions and account records cross circuits you don’t own and must stay confidential for decades.

You own both ends, so PacketLoq fits without anyone else signing off.

  • Confidential for7–30 years
  • Sits underneathYour IPsec site-to-site
  • Runs onServers you already run

Start with one branch link and a packet capture.

Talk to us about a pilot
The product

One binary, on servers you already run.

PacketLoq sits at the edge of each site. Everything behind it stays the same.

  • Running in an afternoon
  • Keys you control, custody you can prove
  • Invisible to your applications
  • Cryptography your auditors already trust
See the product: specs, key custody and how a trial works →
About

Built from experience. Shaped by what’s at stake.

PacketLoq is a small, senior team based in Seattle and working remotely.

Our founding engineers come from satellite ground systems and defense communications. Our product and go-to-market leaders have taken cloud platforms to market at scale.

PacketLoq began with a slow link: large transfers between two of the founders’ own sites slowed to a crawl. Fixing it meant rethinking how data in transit is protected.

  • Based inSeattle, Washington
  • What we buildEncryption for data in motion
  • PatentPending in the US, Canada and the EU
  • Team biosAvailable to customers and investors under NDA
  • Design partnersTaking a small number now. Get in touch
  • Talk to us[email protected]
Next step

Bring us a link and a packet analyzer

Tell us about one link: what it carries, its throughput and what sits at each end.

[email protected]

If we’re not a fit, we’ll say so.

Request a demonstration
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